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CHAPTER 5. WEBS OF INFLUENCE: CORPORATE IMPACTS ON 
GOVERNANCE 
David Miller & Claire Harkins 
 
Summary 
Economic actors are intensely aware of their image and the reputation of both their 
brands and the corporation itself. They know that challenges to their reputation can 
come from a variety of sources, and that corporations, both specifically and generally, 
are viewed with a fair degree of scepticism by both mass and elite audiences. As a 
result, transnational corporations increasingly plan strategies to defend their 
reputation and to protect and extend their market share and political influence.  
 
In understanding governance, we suggest that it is important to properly account for 
corporate strategy.  In doing so, it is necessary to understand that corporate 
strategies routinely involve the use of both direct and indirect means of influence. 
Direct include all those strategies targeted at decision and policy makers. Indirect, by 
contrast, include those where the corporation works to influence a third party (such 
as consumers, decision makers, regulators or competitors) with the aim of capitalising 
on this to influence policy.  
 
This chapter examines the literature on governance, arguing that it neglects the study 
of corporate influences on policy and governance.  It then examines the various 
domains that corporate strategy sets out to dominate and 'capture'.  We then move 
on to examine the relatively new phenomenon of partnership governance in which 
corporations and others are invited into the state to make policy, obviating the need 
to lobby for it. This, we suggest, is the ultimate form of capture - the capture not just 




Corporations are increasingly prominent public and policy actors. They are intensely 
conscious of their profile and the reputation of both their brands and the corporation itself. 
They know that challenges to their licence to operate can come from a variety of sources, 
and that corporations both specifically and generally are viewed with a fair degree of 
scepticism by both mass and elite audiences. As a result, they increasingly plan strategies to 
defend their reputation and to protect and extend their market share and political influence.  
 
In understanding governance, we suggest that it is important to properly account for 
corporate strategy.  In doing so, it is necessary to understand that corporate strategies 
routinely involve the use of both direct and indirect means of influence. Direct include all 
those strategies targeted at decision and policy makers. Indirect, by contrast, include those 
where the corporation works to influence a third party (such as consumers, decision makers, 
regulators or competitors) with the aim of capitalising on this to influence policy.  
 
Governance is a newly popular term in policy sciences, which both reflects and constructs 
changes in how governments work, helping analysts to focus on more than simply 
institutions of government. Approaches to governance typically go beyond institutional 
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analysis of government to include other stakeholders involved in the development, 
implementation and evaluation of policy. The concept of governance is broad and refers to 
decision-making processes in both public and private sectors, including multiple actors.  This 
is an advantage because, in practice, changes in the state mean that governments are 
increasingly reliant on other stakeholders for the implementation of governance in the form 
of policy and public services (Leys 2001). In the area of public health, governance in relation 
to alcohol, gambling or food is governed by a variety of policy networks. The activity of 
corporate and economic actors within these networks facilitates relationships with other 
industry members, policy makers and stakeholder members.  This institutionalises the 
external interests of a particular group within the policy process. 
 
Rhodes (2007) and Kooiman (2003) argue that the governance narrative takes a broader 
perspective than more institutionally-focused, prior work by recognising the limits of the 
state and its reliance on other actors to exercise power and to fulfil its obligations.  Rhodes 
states in relation to this that 'the informal authority of networks supplements and supplants 
the formal authority of government' (Rhodes 2007:6).  In the abstract this might appear 
reasonable, but considered in relation to live policy areas such as alcohol, ethical 
weaknesses appear. This is particularly the case when there is conflict in the policy process, 
as is the case when public health measures are opposed by those with vested interests. 
Because of the assumption of pluralistic policy consensus, Rhodes (2007) underestimates 
how these interactions and the inherent conflicts between actors shape policy outcomes.  
The model Rhodes proposes does not appear able to manage disputed ground within policy 
circles and, rather, assumes an aura of calm and rational negotiation in policy-making. 
  
As a result, the influence of economic actors within modes of governance is often 
overlooked and regularly underestimated.  We argue that in order to understand modes of 
governance in practice, the behaviour and tactics of corporations in their efforts to facilitate 
conditions ripe for promoting and defending their business interests must be considered.  
 
Despite these insights into governance, in practical terms limited empirical work exists to 
show how these relationships and interactions actually work and affect (or not) policy 
outcomes.  Work such as this should start by looking at the strategies of actors in the 
context of the resources they are able to marshal and not from an assumption of policy 




Beginning with corporate strategy and following corporate actions, wherever they take us, 
reveals – amongst other things – that lobbying is widespread in the US and EU – indeed at 
every level of governance (Dinan and Miller 2008, 2012; Miller and Dinan 2008).  Much 
writing on the topic of lobbying – and indeed official definitions of lobbying – adopt a 
narrow conception focusing only on direct meetings between lobbyists and decision makers. 
In reality, it encompasses much wider activities.  At each level of governance, lobbyists 
attempt to influence decisions by capturing policy processes and outcomes. This has been 
described as ‘institutional corruption’ or as ‘market-driven politics’ or ‘post-democracy’ 
(Miller, 2015; Leys, 2001; Crouch, 2004). Lobbyists attempt to secure and capitalize on 
favourable opinions by offering incentives in the form of travel and hospitality, paid and 
unpaid advisory positions, and – the big prize – board memberships once politicians and 
senior civil servants leave public service. The ‘revolving door’ is the term used to describe 
this phenomenon. Institutional corruption is not a term widely used by theorists of 
governance, though they do discuss the rise of the ‘unelected’ in policy making – a 
Governance of addictions in Europe                                                                Chapter 5. Webs of influence 
38 
 
development of which writers such as Vibert (2006), approve. We see this as symptomatic of 
what Janine Wedel has called ‘flex networks’, a new development whereby the 
entanglement of public and private sectors leads to the breakdown of notions of ethical 
behaviour and the collapse of the ability to police such standards as exist (Wedel, 2009). In 
more recent work, Wedel (2014) argues that a new 'stealth corruption' has created new 
forms of unaccountability. 
 
Direct Lobbying  
Lobbying can describe any activity that seeks to influence public policy and governments and 
governance structures.  Lobbying is an industry in its own right that is regarded as a sub-
sector of the Public Relations industry and is known as 'public affairs' – a terms that masks 
the generally 'private' nature of lobbying in practice.  In the UK the lobbying industry was 
worth around £1.9 billion in 2009, double its size in early 1990s (Powerbase 2014a). Many 
lobbyists are former politicians or public officials with contacts and valuable knowledge of 
the policy domain.  Lobbying involves corporate actors, or their representatives, engaging 
directly with decision makers on key issues in order to persuade them to share the corporate 
position.  This can involve formal meetings, consultations and presentations as well as 
informal meetings, dinners and hospitality. Direct lobbying is important for corporations; it 
is, however, only one of a variety of means that corporations have at their disposal to 
manage various social domains.  Indirect lobbying utilises the realms of media, science and 
civil society.   
 
Indirect Lobbying  
Lobbying or corporate public relations campaigns are strategies that include a range of 
elements, including commissioning reports from think tanks, scientists and academics or 
utilising the media to shape public opinion.  Indirect lobbying has the same aim as direct 
lobbying which is to affect decision making. It incorporates a wide range of tactics that 
together contribute important components to the overall lobbying strategy. 
 
Science Capture  
Corporations often produce or commission science that they subsequently use in order to 
advance and support their campaigns.  For example, the Centre for Business and Economic 
Research was hired by SABMiller to provide a report that would be used to undermine the 
Scottish Government’s efforts to introduce a minimum unit price for alcohol.  The CEBR 
report found no economic basis for the introduction of minimum pricing and tried to 
question the established evidence base that supports the policy (CBER 2009). The Weinberg 
Group describes itself as helping 'our clients improve manufacturing processes, clear 
regulatory hurdles, and defend products in the courts and the media'.  Funded by the trade 
association the Brewers of Europe, the Weinberg Group produced material which was used 
to undermine public health evidence on alcohol control policy (Anderson & Baumberg 2007). 
Creating doubt and producing contradictory scientific accounts is a corporate tactic 
pioneered by the tobacco industry in their efforts to fight threats to their economic interests 
that emerged from growing awareness on the harmful effects of tobacco (Michaels 2008).  
There is a growing body of research that suggests industry funded science is more likely to 
result in favourable results for the funder (Babor and Miller 2014). Attempts to manage 
science via funding or by attacking inconvenient findings are complemented by attempts to 
manage media coverage. 
 
Media Capture  
The media can be ‘captured’ by the corporations via the influence of media ownership, 
advertising, public relations and by attacking critics. Media capture is important for a variety 
Governance of addictions in Europe                                                                Chapter 5. Webs of influence 
39 
 
of reasons, but one of them is in its use in securing policy capture.  Media capture is aided by 
the use of seemingly independent organizations which perform a public relations role for 
industry at one remove. (Miller 2009) 
  
One example is the Social Issues Research Centre (SIRC), an ‘independent, non-profit 
organisation’ that says it carries out ‘balanced, calm and thoughtful’ research on lifestyle 
issues such as drinking, diet, and pharmaceuticals. However, it may be perceived that the 
company acts more like a public relations agency for the corporations that fund its activities. 
These include Diageo, Flora, Coca-Cola, the Sugar Bureau, Unilever, Masterfoods, 
GlaxoSmithKline, and Roche, among others. Although SIRC does publish a list of funders, it is 
not immediately apparent which company has sponsored which study and, in some 
instances, this information is not included in media reports (cited in Miller and De Andrade, 
2010). 
Although SIRC’s publicity material regularly uses the term ‘social scientists’ to refer to its 
own staff, it uses the same personnel and office as a commercial market research company, 
MCM Research. SIRC’s co-directors, Peter Marsh and Kate Fox, work for both organizations. 
The MCM website used to ask: ‘Do your PR initiatives sometimes look too much like PR 
initiatives? MCM conducts social/psychological research on the positive aspects of your 
business. The results do not read like PR literature, or like market research data. Our reports 
are credible, interesting and entertaining in their own right. This is why they capture the 
imagination of the media and your customers’ (cited in Ferriman, 1999). Following the 
exposure of these links, the SIRC has now subsumed MCM, indicating a very close 
relationship. 
 
Civil Society Capture  
Civil society is often seen as an arena of citizen interests and democratic possibilities. It is 
certainly true that such groups do exist, are active and can be effective, for example in 
pushing public health measures. Nevertheless, corporate and corporate linked funded (for 
example via charitable Foundations maintained by the corporate rich) are very significant 
components of civil society funding. Think tanks and third party organizations are often used 
by large corporations to spread and garner support for their position.  For example, the pro 
market, liberal (or ‘neoliberal’) Adam Smith Institute and the Institute of Economic Affairs 
(IEA) are multi-year recipients of tobacco industry funding, and the IEA has been in receipt of 
funds connected to the alcohol, food and retail industries. But these think tanks and many 
others are not transparent about their links to the corporations, preferring to operate 
policies of ‘donor confidentiality’ or to launder funds through secretive ‘donor advised’ 
intermediaries (Miller and Harkins 2015: 227-9; Miller et al 2014). 
 
Industry-friendly experts are often recruited to present scientific or complex information as 
in the case of the American Council on Science and Health (Moynihan 2010). Additionally, 
groups are sometimes started to launch campaigns apparently independent from industry, 
such as the recent launch of Action on Consumer Choice in the UK (Doward and Bissett 
2014). The use of fake grass roots citizen groups, or ‘astroturf’ organizations, is a common 
component of indirect lobbying. These appear to be genuine charitable or grass roots 
organizations set up by or in the interests of ordinary citizens.  
 
Though civil society is often touted as a means to advance citizen interests, it is quite clear 
that much of civil society is either conflicted by receipt of corporate or corporate-linked 
funding (as in the case of some well-meaning groups) or is actively part of corporate strategy 
(as in the case of astroturf, front groups or neoliberal think tanks).   
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Policy Capture  
Policy capture is the ultimate aim of all of these tactics and strategies of lobbying. This is 
accomplished by direct contact with decision makers as well as by indirect management of 
the information environment around decision makers. It is clear that lobbyists supplement 
the content of their approaches to decision makers by attempting to recruit former 
politicians and civil servants via the revolving door. This is a chronic problem at national and 
EU levels, as recent examples in relation to alcohol have shown (Miller and Harkins 2013). 
But perhaps the most important example of policy capture is the advent of partnership 
governance. 
 
Self- and Partnership Regulation 
Self-regulation has become an important part of the governance of addictions.  It has 
become the dominant paradigm in tackling public health issues arising from the use of 
addictive products.  Partnership governance dissolves the line between corporation and 
policy maker. 
 
In the UK, an early example was the Portman Group, created in the late 1980s. It was set up 
by the alcohol industry, reportedly
 
at the suggestion of a Tory peer to stave off the threat of 
further regulation of alcohol. (Carey 2003)  Twenty years later, the same
 
companies who 




The Portman Group claims that its role is to promote social responsibility
 
in the alcohol 
industry, with a particular focus on responsible
 
marketing. It claims to 'show leadership
 
on 
best practice in the area of alcohol responsibility' and
 
to 'foster a balanced understanding of 
alcohol-related issues.' (The Portman Group n.d.)  In reality the group acts as a lobbyist for 
the alcohol industry, acting against further alcohol control policy in public and policy debates 
(Harkins 2010).  The Portman Group was also instrumental in the establishment of 
‘Drinkaware’, a national charity to promote responsible drinking and provide alcohol 
education.  Despite claims that Drinkaware is an independent organization, it continues to 
be funded in its entirety by the alcohol industry. Drinkaware presents a view of alcohol and 
its abuse which is consistent with the alcohol industry’s philosophy, and routinely downplays 
the serious health and social consequences that alcohol presents to society (Powerbase 
2014b). 
 
More recently, self-regulatory bodies have been supplemented with partnership regulation. 
The EU Alcohol and Health Forum is one example, as is the UK Department of Health’s Public 
Health Responsibility Network Deal (PHRND). The PHRND was said to be intended to 
develop a platform where economic actors could work with governmental bodies and health 
professional to develop pledges to promote public health.  In practice, the PHRND is 
dominated by economic actors who commit to voluntary actions that make little or no 
contribution to improving public health.  The alcohol network of the PHRND has been unable 
to retain public health organizations as contributors or supporters.  After initially attending 
six meetings, the six key civil society groups originally involved refused to participate further 
in the scheme (Royal College of Physicians 2011);   they felt that the interests of economic 
actors were being put before public health and evidence on meaningful action. The only 
remaining non-governmental and non-industry core members of the group are a 
representative from the Association of Chief Police Officers and representatives from the 
charities Mentor UK and Addaction.  Addaction works in partnership with Diageo, the 
world’s largest spirit producer, and ASDA, a supermarket chain (Addaction 2014). Mentor UK 
also work with and receive funds form Diageo (Mentor UK 2014).        
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The food network has faced a similar reaction from organizations that work to improve 
public health.  The British Heart Foundation and Diabetes UK felt unable to sign up to the 
network, stating that the deal was better for industry than for public health.  The PHRDN 
proposals are, as in the case of the alcohol network, narrow and have often already been 
agreed in other policy circles. The House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee 
(2005: 57) has also been critical: 
 
[The] Public Health Responsibility Deal pledge on obesity is not a 
proportionate response to the scale of the problem… [The Government] 
should consider the ways in which businesses themselves influence the 
behaviour of the population in unhealthy ways. If effective measures cannot 
be achieved through agreement, the Government must pursue them through 
other means.  
 
 
The PHRND, like other partnership-regulatory schemes, does not provide a genuine 
opportunity to work towards improving public health.  The pledges and commitments 
presented are minor, ineffective and many have been previously agreed. They allow industry 
a public relations opportunity while requiring them to do very little.    
 
Both self-regulation and partnership regulation appear to favour the interests of the 
economic actors that produce products which are harmful to human health. Indeed, we can 
say that in addition to enabling undue corporate influence in policy on alcohol or obesity, 
the very form of partnership governance gives a structural advantage to economic actors. 
 
Conclusion  
Governance can be a useful term for understanding recent transformations in governmental 
practice because it stretches the conception of decision making to include policy actors 
outside of the government.  However, it can also limit a richer understanding of the conflicts 
inherent in policy making on addictions when it assumes a consensual policy process. We 
argue that is important to focus on the strategies of policy actors in decision making - 
including, specifically, economic actors. Lobbying is a core function of corporate strategy. 
Indirect lobbying is used to attempt to exert power and control in varying social domains, 
while direct lobbying is reserved for decision makers within policy circles (Miller and Harkins 
2010). We emphasize corporate strategy and its coherence (although internal tensions 
within and between corporations are common). We refer to the 'capture' of a range of 
domains, because it is important to understand that this is a question not only of ‘policy’ 
capture.  
 
Corporate led globalization and neoliberalism have resulted in more stratified decision 
making, both devolving it downwards – for example to new parliaments or via subsidiarity, 
and coordinating it upwards – as in bilateral and multilateral trade deals. The neoliberal era 
ushers in a new political geography of governance. We need to pay close attention to how 
corporate agency is differentiated at the local, national and supranational level. 
Stratification occurs horizontally as well, so that decision making and power flow out from 
the state to private actors. Private actors (and some others) are invited into the state to 
make policy. It is no longer enough to think about corporations only as attempting to 
influence policy. In reality much decision-making power has been directly devolved to them 








Take Home Messages 
 
Corporations are highly conscious of their image, reputation and influence.  
As a result they plan how to interact with policy and governance 
strategically. 
 
Corporate strategy can be followed by tracing corporate memberships and 
funding of a wide variety of organizations. This shows that corporations 
attempt to influence, dominate and 'capture' policy and a range of other 
domains, including science, the media and civil society – in part at least – as 
an indirect way to capture policy. 
 
Corporations have had a measure of success in influencing policy in the 
area of licit products such as tobacco, alcohol, food and gambling.  
However, the more significant area in which they have been influential is in 
shaping the architecture of the policy process including how decisions are 
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